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Abstract: The rise of financial technology means that it is easier than ever to raise funds from 
a large group of people, notably via P2P lending or crowdfunding platforms. This article 
seeks to discuss the law on illegal fundraising, which has existed for some time before the 
boom of the Internet, as a legal response to the increasing number of fundraising from the 
public. Regulation is necessary to ensure market order and investor protection. Virtually in all 
markets, there are restrictions on how entities can make a public offer of shares, bonds, 
and/or other investment schemes. There are several laws, most notably criminal law, in China 
that are relevant to illegal fundraising. An individual/company can potentially breach one or 
more of these rules as long as they attempt to raise funds from a non-conventional (i.e. not 
stock markets or banks) route. The worst outcome of this used to be death penalty. There has 
been a degree of ambiguities in the application of these laws. The article will attempt to 
clarify these ambiguities. The regulation of illegal fundraising can have a far reaching 
consequence on the financial markets in China, considering that non-state entities, 
particularly SMEs, have limited access to conventional finance. The article will consider 
whether China is on the right track in terms of regulation to allow alternative fundraising 
channels to thrive. This article is the first ever to present a holistic account of the regulation 
of illegal fundraising in China. 
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The rise of technology means that funds can be raised from a large group of people easier 
than ever. The fall of Ezubao1, a peer-to-peer online lending platform, has angered and 
shocked the whole country of China, including the head of state, Xi Jinping. Whilst the rise 
of Financial Technology, in short FinTech, and the regulation of it, has caught the attention of 
scholars2, this article does not wish to go down that path. Instead, this article seeks to focus 
on the very law regulating illegal fundraising which has existed for some time, before the 
boom of the Internet, and been applied in cases such as Ezubao. Illegal fundraising is not 
exactly a recent phenomenon. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey 
Company3, a case decided in 1946 in the US, the core legal issue was whether an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development, coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing, and 
remitting the net proceeds to the investor, would constitute an offering of an ‘investment 
contract’ within the meaning of that term as used in the Securities Act of 1933 of the US and 
therefore require registration under the law. The importance of the case was that, it set out a 
landmark test, known as the Howey test, to determine whether an instrument qualifies as an 
‘investment contract’ for the purposes of the Securities Act. At the end, Howey was found 
liable for violating the law. 
   Likewise, the agricultural sector used to be the focus of China in this area of law. The 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) issued the Emergency Notice on the Use of Manor 
Development for Illegal Fundraising4 in 1998 to explicitly ban cases like Howey. Shortly 
before that, in 1997, China revised its Criminal Law for the first time since it had been 
introduced in 1980, to include sections for the crimes collectively known as ‘crimes of 
undermining the order of financial management’ and ‘crimes of financial fraud’.5 This was 
part of an integrated strategy to curb the problem. The strategic role of the financial markets 
in supporting sustainable economic growth was formally recognised in 2004, when the 
Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of 
Capital Markets were issued.6 Promoting capital markets and increasing public awareness of 
their importance are regarded as national strategies. Further, the Opinions advocate the need 
to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework and step up enforcement efforts to maintain 
market order and protect investors’ interests. In 2010, the Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court of Several Issues on the Specific Application of Law in the Handling of 
Criminal Cases about Illegal Fundraising was issued.7 The Interpretation on the one hand 
upholds the criminal nature of illegal fundraising, but on the other hand provides leeway for 
cases when funds are raised for ‘normal manufacturing or business operation and the 
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 More to be discussed below on this case. 
2
 See for example, Weihuan Zhou et al., ‘Regulation of Digital Financial Services in China: Last Mover 
Advantage’ (2015) 8 Tsinghua China Law Review 25; Douglas Arner and Janos Barberis, ‘FinTech in China: 
From the Shadows?’ (2015) 3 Journal of Financial Perspectives 78; Long Chen, ‘From Fintech to Finlife: the 
Case of Fintech Development in China’ (2016) 9 China Economic Journal 225; and Haifang Yao et al., ‘Study 
on P2P Lending Regulation’ (2015) 3 Renmin Chinese Law Review 92.  
3
 Securities and Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Company 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
4
 Order No. 509 (1998) of the People’s Bank of China. 
5
 Chapter III Sections 4 & 5 of the law. 
6
 Order No. 3 (2004) of the State Council. 
7
 The Interpretation was adopted at the 1,502nd session of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's 
Court on 22 November 2010, and came into force on 4 January 2011. 
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borrower can return the entire solicited fund within the required time…or if an act is 
obviously of minor importance’.8  
   This article will be divided into four main sections. Part II will discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings in this area of law. Part III will discuss the trajectory of the laws regulating 
illegal fundraising. Whilst the main legislation is the Criminal Law of China, the part will 
concern its connections with other laws9 which can function together with the Criminal Law 
as a whole regulatory package. Any notable court cases related to illegal fundraising will be 
discussed. Part IV will proceed to discuss the causes of the prevalence of the problem. These 
are stemmed from the demand and supply side factors. On the one hand, entrepreneurs have 
been baffled by the limited fundraising channels in China. On the other hand, an unusually 
high saving rate in China means that there is a need to properly channel these savings to 
productive use to foster economic growth. Part V will discuss whether China is heading 
towards the right way to regulate illegal fundraising before a conclusion is made. This article 
is the first ever to present a holistic account of the regulation of illegal fundraising in China. 
II. Theoretical Underpinnings of Regulation in this Area 
The concerns underlying the context of this article are twofold: first the need to regulate an 
‘investment contract’ as in Howey; second the need to regulate entities functioning as a 
‘bank’. In the view of MacNeil, the bottom line is, contract and property law should be 
capable of providing a basic degree of protection to investors.10  Contract is the primary 
mechanism through which rights and obligations associated with investing are created. For 
example, company shares can be regarded as a ‘statutory contract’ that links a shareholder 
with a company and the other shareholders.11 The contract exists predominantly in the form 
of the articles of association of a company which define various rights of shareholders, such 
as voting rights and the right to dividend, and the distribution of power within a company.12 
On the other hand, one key concept in property law is ownership. Ownership is a set of legal 
rights held by an owner in respect of a property, be it tangible like a piece of land or 
intangible like most types of financial investments. In the context of China, the Contract Law 
was enacted in 1999 and sought to protect ‘the legitimate rights and interests of the parties to 
contracts, maintaining the socio-economic order and promoting the socialist 
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 Art 3 of the Interpretation. 
9
 These laws include, but are not limited to, the laws issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress such as the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Punishment of 
Crimes of Disrupting Financial Order [Order No. 52 (1995) of the President of the People's Republic of China; 
administrative regulations issued by the State Council such as the Measures for Banning Illegal Financial 
Institutions and Illegal Financial Business Activities [Order No. 247 (1998) of the State Council; revised in  
2011 by Order No. 588 of the State Council]; government regulations issued by government departments such 
as General Provisions on Lending [Order No. 2 (1996) of the People’s Bank of China]; judicial interpretation 
issued by the Supreme People 's Court such as the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of Several 
Issues on the Specific Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases about Illegal Fundraising 
[Interpretation No.18 (2010) of the Supreme People’s Court]; and so on. 
10
 Iain MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (Hart, 2012) 8-9.  
11
 Such a view is recognised by for example, section 33 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
12
 Under Art 11 of the Chinese Company Law, to establish a company, the articles of association shall be 
formulated according to the law. A company's articles of association shall be binding upon the company, 
shareholders, directors, supervisors and senior officers. The Chinese Company Law was first adopted at the 5th 
Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People's Congress on 29 December 1993 and last revised 
on 28 December 2013 in at the 6th Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress. 
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modernisation’.13  According to Matheson, there is a degree of convergence between the 
Chinese Contract Law and that of Western economic and legal systems. 14  Western 
economists and historians have long emphasised the importance of institutions. 15  The 
institutions hypothesis alleges that societies with a social organisation that provides 
encouragement for investment will prosper. This new movement of institutional economics 
has generally identified itself as an attempt to extend the range of neoclassical theory by 
explaining the institutional factors traditionally taken as givens, such as property rights and 
governance structures.16 Whilst contractual rights can be regarded as a form of property, the 
first Property Law in China was not introduced until 2007.17 On the one hand, adoption of the 
Property Law is viewed as a ‘substantial step toward protection of private property rights’.18 
On the other hand, how private property rights can be enforced in a country where the public 
or state ownership is still playing a leading role is questionable.19 
   La Porta and colleagues argue that optimal regulatory arrangements can be distilled down 
to three broad hypotheses.20 The very liberal approach implies that the optimal government 
policy is to leave financial markets unregulated because the market and some general legal 
mechanisms are sufficient for the markets to prosper.  A less liberal approach suggests law is 
necessary owing to the consideration of enforcement costs and opportunistic behaviour of 
market players. One option is the standardisation of the private contracting framework to 
improve market discipline and private litigation through specialised law, most notably 
securities law. Ultimately, governmental intervention may be desirable when all existing 
markets, legal mechanisms and private enforcement incentives are deemed insufficient. 
Therefore, a public enforcer is needed to support trade. Public enforcement may work 
because the enforcer is independent and focused. In the context of this article, the highest 
level of regulation is witnessed around the world. For example in China, there are the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) overseeing the banking sector and the securities markets respectively. The regulatory 
objectives of the two are not necessarily the same. According to Allen and Herring, banking 
regulation is primarily designed to prevent systemic risk while securities regulation is 
                                                          
13
 Art 1 of the Chinese Contract Law. The law was adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's 
Congress on 15 March 1999. 
14
 John Matheson, ‘Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China’ (2006) 15 Minnesota Journal of 
International Law 329, 381. 
15
 Daron Acemoglu et al., ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World 
Income Distribution’ (2002) 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1231, 1262. 
16
 Malcolm Rutherford, ‘Institutional Economics: Then and Now’ (2001) 15 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
173, 187. 
17
 MacNeil indicates that different legal systems have varied in their recognition of contractual rights as a form 
of (transferable) property. See MacNeil (n 10) 11. The Chinese Property Law was adopted at the Fifth Session 
of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 16 March 2007. 
18
 Mo Zhang, ‘From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property 
Rights in China’ (2008) 5 Berkeley Business Law Journal 317. 
19
 Ibid. On a more positive note, Berkowitz and colleagues are of the opinion that the Chinese Property Law by 
codifying fundamental protections of creditor rights and restraints on the grabbing hand of governments can 
improve de facto property rights. In their study, they showed that these improvements in property rights can 
promote firm value and thus economic growth. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., ‘Do Property Rights Matter? 
Evidence from a Property Law Enactment’ (2015) 116 Journal of Financial Economics 583. 
20
 Rafael La Porta et al., ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’ (2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1, 1-3. 
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primarily for investor protection and efficiency enhancement.21 As said in the beginning of 
this part and the next part will also proceed to show, illegal fundraising in China concerns 
both areas of regulation.  
   Pan rightly indicates that regulation seeks to achieve certain economic and social 
objectives. 22  Economic regulation seeks to address market failures such as natural 
monopolies, externalities, imperfect information, principal-agent problems, excessive 
competition, anticompetitive behaviour and disruptive business cycles. Social regulation, on 
the other hand, attempts to achieve certain social objectives that private persons on their own 
will not pursue, including distributional justice and access to judicial remedies. MacNeil 
particularly highlights unrestricted access and information asymmetry as justifications of 
regulation. 23  The former clearly has a damaging effect to the market if unscrupulous 
individuals are permitted to participate. Information asymmetry is also a problem in that 
investors who lack information may decide not to invest or to limit their investment, 
narrowing the scope and size of the market. 
   The banking sector carries three functions: liquidity transformation, maturity 
transformation, and credit transformation.24 The first function allows users to access money 
for consumption purposes. The second function points to the role of banks to translate short-
term deposits into long term investments. Finally, banks are critical to the financing of 
individuals and small and medium-sized companies. The system works well in normal 
circumstances, but at the same time is fragile. One notable example is a bank run. In the event 
of a large number of depositors withdrawing their investments, the bank may not meet their 
demands by liquidating assets and cashing in long term investments. Banks’ fragility, 
combined with the important functions they perform, engenders a belief that they need to be 
regulated.25 In this regard, four typical regulatory tools can be employed. The first is to 
impose capital requirements on banks. The second is to require banks to hold some of their 
assets in a liquid form. The third is to set up a lender of last resort that stands ready to make 
loans to banks, and the fourth is insurance against risks of losses on deposits. These tools are 
witnessed in China. For example, China launched a long-awaited deposit insurance system in 
2015. Deposits up to RMB 500,000 are now insured.26 Of course, it may have little relevance 
in the context of this article as it is unlikely that the ‘illegal’ fundraising schemes will be 
administered by banks recognised by the PBOC, which is the backer of the deposit insurance 
system.  
   In an illegal fundraising scheme, a vast number of the general public are generally affected 
and suffer financial loss. There is a need to differentiate ‘sophisticated’ and ‘retail’ 
investors. 27  The latter are generally individuals acting in a personal capacity or small 
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 Franklin Allen and Richard Herring, ‘Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation’ (2001) Centre 
for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-29, Wharton School Centre for Financial Institutions, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
22
 Eric Pan, ‘Understanding Financial Regulation’ [2012] Utah Law Review 1897, 1902-1903. 
23
 See MacNeil (n 10) 28-29. 
24
 John Armour et al., Principles of Financial Regulation (OUP, 2016) 277. 
25
 Ibid. 279. 
26
 Gabriel Wildau, ‘China Deposit Insurance Paves Way for Deregulation of Interest Rates’ Financial Times (31 
March 2015). See also Yi Zhou, ‘Establishing a Deposit Insurance System in China: A Long-Awaited Move 
Toward Deepening Financial Reform’ (2016) 16 Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 
46. 
27
 Armour et al. (n 24) 205-207. 
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businesses in each case dealing with relatively modest sums. Measures are deployed most 
strongly in favour of investors from this group, where information asymmetry and 
behavioural biases are so prevalent. Standard legal protections are essential in a scenario 
where investors are too naïve to protect themselves.  There can be various legal strategies. 
For example, the US’s Securities Act 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 1933 provide 
two basic sets of rules for investor protection: mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud.28 These 
two elements are often regarded as fundamental to a strong securities market. Around the 
world, there are two main types of systems for listing shares. One is the registration system 
while the other is the verification and approval system.29 The former is simpler, and is found 
in the US, the UK, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, Singapore, Germany and France. As long 
as the applicant complies with all the prescribed listing requirements, no further procedures 
are required. In this system, the market is the ultimate decisive factor. By contrast, under the 
verification and approval system, the relevant authority will examine and verify the 
documents for listing, and if necessary, disallow the company’s listing. Therefore, in practice, 
the authority has the power to decide whether a company can be listed or not. This system is 
adopted by China, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.30 In this system, the regulator 
itself is acting as a guardian of quality. This illustrates the attitude of China in financial 
regulation by maintaining a tighter grip on the markets, when compared to certain leading 
markets. The question is how intensive we want the financial regulation to be.31 
   Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Andrew Tyrie MP, 
once observed that:  
Despite the financial crisis and the spate of mis-selling scandals, we still have not seen 
anybody sent to jail. Is that because nobody ought to go to jail, or because there is a 
fundamental failure in the sanctions regime or the legal system in the UK?32 
   The criminal law is a significant part of the regulation of the financial markets. According 
to Hudson, the criminalisation of some financial activities is of great importance in the 
creation of a culture of compliance.33  Much of the purpose of the criminal law in the law of 
finance is either to achieve broader policy goals or to create the impression of the pursuit of 
broader policy goals.34 As in Howey, although the case itself did not involve criminal liability 
(when only an injunction was sought), the US Supreme Court did point out explicitly that the 
policy of the Securities Act is to afford ‘broad protection to investors’.35 In the context of 
China, according to the Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and 
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 Hideki Kanda, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance – Country Report: Japan’ in Klaus Hopt et al. (eds) 
Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of Art and Emerging Research (OUP, 1998) 925. 
29
 Alex Lau, ‘A Study on Listing Applications in the People’s Republic of China’ (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 
90, 92. 
30
 It is worth highlighting that China has been moving towards a registration system. Xie Yu, ‘China ushers in 
new IPO registration system but it’s likely to come with “Chinese characteristics”’ SCMP (9 December 2015).  
31
 For a cross-country comparison, see Howell Jackson, ‘Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: 
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications’ (2007) 24 Yale Journal on Regulation 253. China has not been 
examined by Jackson. For the case of China, see Wenming Xu et al., ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Public 
Enforcement of Securities Law in China: Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle’ (2017) 18 European Business 
Organization Law Review 367. 
32
 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards - Minutes of Evidence: HL Paper 27-III/HC 175-III (17 
January 2013). 
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Steady Growth of Capital Markets36, China's capital markets have been recognised as ‘an 
important component part of the socialist market economy’ by contributing greatly to the 
reform and development of state-owned enterprises and the financial market, to the 
optimisation of resources allocation and to the promotion of economic restructuring and 
growth. Much emphasis has been placed on ‘the steady growth of capital markets’. As rightly 
put by Schultz, the enactment of the criminal law was intended to combat the ‘deleterious 
effects of [certain economic] crimes on China’s social and economic development’.37 The 
criminalisation of illegal fundraising clearly has had the mission of preserving the stability of 
Chinese financial markets. 
III. The Law Regulating Illegal Fundraising 
The starting point of regulation was seen in 1995, when the Law on Commercial Banks38 
introduced criminal sanctions on those who ‘illegally absorb public deposits or absorb public 
deposits in a disguised way’.39 The relevant sanctions are contained in the Criminal Law.40  
Entities who commit the offence can be sentenced to not more than three years in prison and 
additionally face a fine of not less than RMB 20,000 but not more than RMB 200,000. For 
more serious offence when the amount involved is significant, the prison sentence can range 
from three years to ten years, together with a larger fine of RMB 50,000 to RMB 500,000. 
Despite designating ‘illegal fundraising’ as a criminal offence, the law did not attempt to give 
it a precise definition until 2010. In this year, the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s 
Court of Several Issues on the Specific Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases 
about Illegal Fundraising was issued.41 The Interpretation sets out four features of ‘absorbing 
public savings illegally or in disguised form’.42 These four features include: 1) absorbing 
funds without the legal approval of the relevant department or under the disguise of lawful 
business operations; 2) absorbing funds from the general public, i.e. unspecified people; 3) 
promising to repay the principal and interests or make payments in the form of currency, real 
objects, equities, etc. within a certain time limit; and 4) publicising by means of media, 
recommendation fairs, leaflets, mobile phone text messages and so on. Further, there is an 
exhaustive list of 11 specific types of illegal fundraising.43 In addition, the Interpretation sets 
out the extent of adverse impact that will lead to criminal liability and what will constitute a 
‘more serious offence’ to justify heavier penalties.44 
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 See n 6 above.  
37
 Cynthia Schultz, ‘Economic Crimes in the People's Republic of China: A Swinging Door Policy’ (1989) 5 
American University International Law Review 161. 
38
 The law was adopted at the 13th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's 
Congress on 10 May 1995. It was subsequently revised by the 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
Tenth National People's Congress on 27 December 2003. 
39
 Art 79 of the 1995 law; Art 81 of the 2003 law. 
40
 Art 176 of the Criminal Law. The Criminal Law of China was adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth 
National People's Congress on 1 July 1979 and revised by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People's 
Congress on 14 March 1997; the most recent ninth amendments were done in 2015. 
41
 Interpretation No.18 (2010) of the Supreme People’s Court. 
42
 Art 1 of the Interpretation. These four features must all be met to establish an offence. For example, it is 
acceptable to absorb funds from relatives, friends or specific person within an entity without publicity in the 
society.  
43
 Art 2 of the Interpretation. 
44
 A criminal offence in this regard will involve: i) funds of over RMB 200,000 million for an individual 
offender (or RMB 1 million for an enterprise offender); or ii) over 30 victims (or 150 for an enterprise case); or 
iii) causing economic loss of over RMB 100,000 (or RMB 500,000 for an enterprise case). For a more serious 
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   In relation to the first feature of illegal fundraising on approval, on the face of it, it is the 
normal business of commercial banks to absorb public deposits.45 In China, all commercial 
banks must be approved by the CBRC. 46  There is a minimum capital requirement. 47 
Depending on the nature of the bank, concerning whether it is operating at a national level, 
city level or village level, the amount can range from RMB 1 billion to RMB 50 million. 
Alternatively, it is possible for companies to issue shares to, and therefore raise funds from 
the public. Similarly, a public issue must be approved by the CSRC.48 As a basic requirement, 
issuers are expected to have sustainable profitability and sound financial position.49 Once 
approved, shares can be issued to unspecified objects or more than 200 specified objects. A 
public issue without the necessary approval can lead to criminal sanctions.50  Even in a 
smaller company (or investment scheme) which does not involve the public, it may still 
constitute a criminal offence if fraud is involved or the operation is simply regarded as 
illegal.51  The former could lead to death penalty.52  Owing to the difficulty to prove the 
intention to defraud, it is observed that the courts seem to favour certain high status offenders 
by charging them with the less severe crime of illegal fundraising, as opposed to fundraising 
fraud.53 In other words, there is an element of arbitrariness in deciding what charge to bring. 
One notable example will be the Wu Ying case.54 Wu Ying was initially charged with illegal 
fundraising, but the charge later escalated to fundraising fraud. It is suggested that Wu Ying’s 
peasant family background may have contributed to the escalation of charge.55 Furthermore, 
the case was intended to be a high profile example to deter further emerging private finance.56 
In 2007, Wu Ying was arrested by the police for raising RMB 770 million from 11 people, 
with high interest rates promised. On the face of it, the case should not entail illegal 
fundraising as she did not raise funds from the general public.  
   This relates to the second feature about the involvement of the public. It is echoed by other 
financial rules and regulations.57 200 is a notable number to define the word ‘public’. Article 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
offence, it will involve: i) funds of over RMB 1 million for an individual offender (or RMB 5 million for an 
enterprise offender); or ii) over 100 victims (or 500 for an enterprise case); or iii) causing economic loss of over 
RMB 500,000 (or RMB 2.5 million for an enterprise case). 
45
 Art 3 of the Law on Commercial Banks 2003. 
46
 Ibid. Art 16. 
47
 Ibid. Art 13.  
48
 Art 10 of the Chinese Securities Law. This law was adopted at the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee 
of the Ninth National People's Congress on 29 December 1998; last amended at the Tenth Session of the 
Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People's Congress on 31 August 2014. 
49
 Ibid. Art 13. 
50
 Art 179 of the Criminal Law of China. 
51
 Ibid. Arts 160, 192 & 225. See the texts of the articles which stipulate the relevant penalties.  
52
 Ibid. Art 199, before the amendment in 2015.  
53
 Hongming Cheng, ‘Financial Fraud in China: A Structural Examination of Law and Law Enforcement’ in 
Susan Will et al. (eds) How They Got Away With It: White Collar Criminals and the Financial Meltdown 
(Columbia University Press, 2012) 304.  
54
 Wu Ying (2009) No. 1 Jinhua Intermediate People’s Court and (2010) No. 27 Zhejiang Higher People’s Court. 
Arguably, a landmark case on illegal fundraising and has been discussed extensively by literature. See e.g. 
Xiang Ren, ‘Judicial Cases in China in 2012’ (2013) 1 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 409, and Shen Wei, 
‘Market-Based Regulatory Responses to Private Lending in China: Beyond a Law and Society Paradigm’ (2017) 
4 Asian Journal of Law and Society 59.  
55
 Cheng (n 53) 304.  
56
 Yunxin Tu and Qianhong Qin, ‘The Real Plight between the Judicature and Public Opinion and its Extrication 
in terms of Jurisprudence’ (2013) 1 China Legal Science 97, 104. 
57
 Sub-Committee of Legislative Affairs of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the 
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, ‘Determination to Prevent and Combat Illegal Fundraising 
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6 of the Interpretation prohibits the issuance of company shares and bonds to unspecified 
persons or specified group of over 200 people, without approval of the competent authorities, 
which is reinforced by the aforementioned requirement under the securities law. Similar 
provision was also found in the Interim Measures for the Administration of Capital Trust of 
the Trust and Investment Companies58, trust and investment companies were not allowed to 
have over 200 investment contracts at a time.59 Despite the fact that the number of 200 can 
provide some guidance of what can constitute ‘the public’, there is not a bright line rule in 
practice.60 In the case of Jiang Xuexiu61, Jiang was the general manager of Qin Jian Tea 
Technology Company. The company was incorporated by Jiang and her husband Qin Qishu 
with a registered capital of RMB 5 million. The line of business was tea cultivation, 
processing, marketing and production of ceramics for sale. From 2007 to 2009, Qin Jian 
Company raised RMB 73 million from 345 people. As of the time when Jiang and Qin was 
convicted of illegal absorbing public savings under Article 176 of the Criminal Law, the 
victims were only returned RMB 56 million in principal and an interest of RMB 8 million. 
Jiang and Qin were handed a sentence of imprisonment for six years and five years 
respectively, together with a fine of RMB 200,000 each. On the face of it, the conviction and 
the resulting sentence were all done in accordance with the law, which has been discussed 
above. However, in this case, out of the 345 victims, a number of them were actually the 
employees of Qian Jian Company, as well as their friends and families. It is dubious if these 
individuals should constitute the meaning of ‘unspecified persons or specified group’ under 
the Interpretation. This can be contrasted to the cases of Xiling District Property 
Development Company62 and Tian Jianzhou63. In these two cases, the amount raised from 
employees was indeed regarded as internal fundraising and was deductible from the overall 
amount of fundraising when deciding whether or not there was a breach of Article 176.  
   In relation to the third element of illegal fundraising about return, under the Measures for 
the Administration of Trust Companies' Trust Plans of Assembled Funds, when 
recommending a trust plan, a trust company cannot promise in any way that the trust capital 
would suffer no loss, or guarantee in any way the minimum return of the trust capital.64 
Similarly, the CSRC has prohibited securities firms from promising their clients, by written 
or oral, express or implied form, any investment returns. 65  Any forecast of investment 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Activities: Q&A with Xinhua News’ [堅決防範和打擊非法集資等違法犯罪活動—全國人大常委會法制工
作委員會和國務院法制辦公室負責人答新華社記者問] (2007) . 
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 Order No.7 (2002) of the People's Bank of China. It was repealed by the Measures for the Administration of 
Trust Companies' Trust Plans of Assembled Funds [No. 3 (2007) of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission]. 
59
 Art 6 of the Interim Measures. 
60
 Wei He and Lufeng Wang, ‘On the Definition of ‘Public’ in the Crime of Illegally Absorbing Public Deposits’ 
(2013) 11 Legal Studies [法學] 156. 
61
 Jiang Xuexiu (2011) Hunan Baojing County People's Procuratorate. 
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proceeds must be substantiated and for a reference purpose only. Ultimately, all investment 
risks should be borne by the clients.  
   As for the final feature about a publicity campaign, the Interim Measures also prohibited 
the companies to conduct marketing campaigns through newspapers, television, broadcasting 
or other public media.66 Violation of this provision by the trust and investment companies 
will be regarded as illegal fundraising. Furthermore, as per the Interpretation, any advertising 
agencies which play a part in the illegal fundraising activities can be criminally liable.67 
   The scale of illegal fundraising activities has attracted the attention of various regulators 
and government departments. According to the PBOC, in 1998, there were 7,900 illegal 
fundraising activities involving an amount of RMB 39 billion.68 The State Council released 
the statistics of 2006 revealing 1,999 illegal fundraising activities in the year involving an 
amount of around RMB 30 billion.69 To act in line with the State Council’s direction to 
combat the problem, the Inter-agency Anti-illegal Fundraising Taskforce was established.70 
According to the Taskforce, the scale and number of the problem has reached record high 
recently.71 In 2015, the number of cases reached 6,000, totalling RMB 250 billion. In the first 
quarter of 2016 alone, there were 2,300 new cases. President Xi Jinping of China has 
expressed his concern over the situation.72 He was particularly concerned about using e-
finance to disguise illegal fundraising in recent cases of Ezubao and Zhongjin, which caused 
substantial financial loss to the public and disrupted market order. 
A. Ezubao 
Established in 2014, Ezubao was one of China’s highest-profile peer-to-peer lending sites, 
promising investors annual returns of up to 15 per cent. According to the estimate of the 
Financial Times, RMB 50 billion was involved in the company’s ‘Ponzi scheme’, affecting 
900,000 investors.73 Ezubao used to be the star of the financial investment platforms in China, 
moving an approximate RMB 800 million a day, amidst the competition from more than 
3,000 similar operations.74 Ezubao claimed to be a peer-to-peer lender, matching investors 
with potential borrowers over the Internet. The legal consideration of this is that, as a 
middleman, they were not raising funds themselves per se, but just for other borrowers, as a 
way to get around the Criminal Law. These products offered investors annual interest 
payments of 9 to 14.6 per cent. However, most of the investment products the company 
                                                          
66
 Art 4(5) of the Interim Measures. 
67
 Art 8 of the Interpretation and Art 222 of the Criminal Law.  
68
 Notice of the People's Bank of China to Further Combat Illegal Fundraising Activities [Order No. 289 (1999) 
of the People's Bank of China].  
69
 Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issues concerning Severely Punishing Illegal Funds 
Raising According to Law [Order No. 34 (2007) of the General Office of the State Council]. 
70
 China Banking Regulatory Commission, ‘CBRC Officials Answered Questions on Anti-illegal Fund-raising’ 
(2013) <http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID=B031026DB58947299C773504ACF79043>. 
71
 Caixin, ‘The Scale of Illegal Fundraising Reached a Peak in 2015’ [2015年非法集資案件達歷史最高峰值] 
(2016) <http://finance.caixin.com/2016-04-27/100937395.html>. 
72
 In a speech by President Xi at a Symposium on Cybersecurity and IT Application on 19 April 2016. 
73
 Tom Mitchell, ‘Arrests in China over $7.6bn Ponzi Scheme’ Financial Times (1 February 2016). 
74
 Aladdin Rillo and Valdimir dela Cruz, ‘The Development Dimension of E-Commerce in Asia: Opportunities 




marketed were fake. The investment platform was primarily used to enrich top executives.75 
That included more than RMB 1 billion, that Ding Ning, the company’s 34-year-old founder, 
is reported to have spent on items and gifts including real estate, cars and luxury goods. 
Further, the salary paid to Ding’s brother, Ding Dian, was increased to RMB 1 million a 
month from RMB 18,000. The company spent as much as RMB 800 million on payroll in a 
month. Xinhua News first reported the enforcement action against the company by the police 
in December 2015.76 Chinese police have arrested more than 20 people. The Chinese police 
has taken the unprecedented step to start a web portal to collect evidence from the victims so 
as to facilitate their investigation. 77  Following the investigation, Beijing People’s 
Procuratorate in December 2016 filed charges of fraudulent fundraising78 against Ezubao's 
parent companies, Yucheng Holdings and Yucheng Global, and ten people. A further 16 
individuals were charged with illegally absorbing public deposits79. 
B. Zhongjin 
Zhongjin, a Shanghai-based investment firm, was another Ponzi scheme, which was self-
confessed outright by its founder on state television.80 Zhongjin Capital Management was 
established by Xu Qin in 2012, with a registered capital of RMB 10 million. It was reported 
that the firm had raised funds illegally from 25,000 investors involving a sum of almost RMB 
40 billion. Xu, together with 35 executives, were arrested in 2016 by the Shanghai police for 
illegal fundraising. In the beginning, Zhongjin would promise a monthly return of 2 per cent 
and quickly amassed RMB 50 million. To build up a premium corporate brand, the firm set 
up offices in high end commercial buildings like Jin Mao Tower and Shanghai World 
Financial Centre. Meanwhile, the firm’s promised return increased to 10 to 25 per cent or 
even up to 400 per cent.  Owing to the nature of its business as an investment firm, it was 
subject to the regulation of the Securities Investment Fund Law.81 Quite consistent to a point 
made before, Article 51 of the law stipulates that the public offering of a fund must be 
registered with the securities regulatory authority of the State Council. Otherwise, according 
to Article 88, a private fund should not be offered to more than 200 investors. Indeed, 
additional constrains are present if the fund is operating in a corporate form or a partnership 
form, which means that the investor will be either a shareholder or a partner of the firm, as 
opposed to a client. According to the Chinese Company Law, the number of shareholders in a 
limited liability company is limited to 50 only.82 Likewise, a limited liability partnership can 
only have up to 50 members.83 To get around all these requirements, Xu established more 
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than 200 affiliated companies to accommodate the rapid expansion of his firm. All the returns 
from these companies came almost solely from the contribution from the investors. Coupled 
with the lavish lifestyle of Xu, who reportedly spent RMB 500 million of the investors’ 
money, the demise of the firm appeared inevitable.    
IV. What Makes the Problem so Prevalent? 
The phenomenon of ‘credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular 
banking system’ is generally known as ‘shadow banking’.84 This is a concern because it is 
regarded as a source of ‘systemic risk or regulatory arbitrage’.85 Being outside the formal 
banking sector generally means they lack a strong safety net, such as publicly guaranteed 
deposit insurance or lender of last resort facilities from central banks, and operate with a 
different, and usually lesser, level of regulatory oversight.86 These characteristics increase the 
risks for financial stability, which justifies the need for regulation. The primary role of a 
functional financial system is the allocation of ownership of the economy’s capital stock.87 
The market is a developed system which creates information about investment projects and 
can therefore guide investors’ funds to better uses.88 Specialisation, as well as acquisition and 
dissemination of information, is encouraged to reduce the cost of aggregating dispersed 
savings, thereby facilitating investment.89 Different modes of finance may serve different 
purposes. It is thought that in the presence of asymmetric information, banks generally 
finance only well-established, safe borrowers, while stock markets can encourage more risky, 
productive and innovative projects.90  A notable advantage of bank finance over a stock 
market is, the latter is only accessible by large companies only, when a loan from banks is in 
principle accessible to everyone.  
   In 1949, when the communist government came to power, stock exchanges were viewed as 
one of the most prominent symbols of an oppressive capitalist regime and were forced to 
close down. State-owned banks have since become the sole representatives of the financial 
sector in the country. Banks still intermediate nearly 75 per cent of the capital in China, a 
significantly higher proportion than in other Asian countries (43 per cent in India, 35 per cent 
in Japan and 33 per cent in South Korea) and the US (only 19 per cent).91 However, the 
banking sector in China has suffered from various problems, notably non-performing loans. 
This problem of the Chinese bank-centred system can be explained by several factors. First, 
state-controlled banks have continued to account for 83 per cent of bank assets in China since 
the new millennium.92 The state ownership of banks has reduced competition and lessened 
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the pressure on banks to operate on a commercial, profit-oriented basis. Second, there is a 
lack of good internal credit assessment capabilities in many banks. The reason behind most of 
the non-performing loans in the past was the directed lending policies of the government to 
fund state-owned enterprises (SOEs) regardless of their profitability. Third, these state-owned 
banks have a decentralised structure. Lending decisions are made at the local branch level, 
which is susceptible to influence from local government and favouritism towards local SOEs. 
This diffuse structure of banks and many SOEs makes it difficult for banks to collect and 
share useful information to make an informed lending decision. 
   SOEs are favoured for a variety of reasons, including: implicit state guarantees; favoured 
market positions for some SOEs that make them better credit risks; internal reward and 
punishment systems that mean a failed loan to an SOE is unlikely to be punished severely 
while bad loans to the private sector can lead to job loss; social/career considerations that 
make lending to entities run by powerful Party members attractive; and even direct pressure 
from party or state officials.93 In other words, it is dubious if individuals and/or small and 
medium-sized enterprises can get money from banks easily. 
 
   According to the World Bank’s Doing Business project, which provides objective measures 
of business regulations and their enforcement across 190 economies, China ranks 62 in the 
aspect of getting credit in 2017.94 In Shanghai, 91.1 per cent of individuals and firms are 
listed in a public credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 
years, enabling lenders to make an informed lending decision. This is very high, compared to 
an East Asia and Pacific average of 14.7 per cent and an OECD high income country average 
of 12.1 per cent. By contrast, the story is quite different when considering the degree to 
which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders. China just 
has a score of 4 in the strength of legal rights index, as opposed to an average of 6.6 and 6 for 
the East Asia and Pacific region, and OECD high income countries respectively. Weak legal 
rights can make borrowers more reluctant to borrow, and lenders more reluctant to lend.  
 
   Viable fundraising channels must be in place to ensure the survival of emerging private 
economic activities. The process of economic liberalisation in China started when the 
communist party began to focus their work on ‘social modernisation’ in 1979 and recognised 
that China’s economy had underperformed for many years.95 The most important aspect of 
modernisation was the change in policy away from the state’s control of the economy and 
towards the gradual recognition of the role of private companies. Accessing credit remains a 
significant obstacle for Chinese companies. As of the end of 2006, according to the World 
Bank, smaller businesses, which contributed some 60 per cent of China’s GDP, accounted for 
only 15 per cent of outstanding credit, most of which was from banks.96 Fast-forwarding 
almost 10 years to 2015, loans offered by banks to smaller businesses increased to 23.6 per 
cent of the total amount, when their share of the national economy was roughly the same as 
before.97 The weaknesses in China’s financial sector motivated businesses, especially small 
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and medium-sized enterprises, to rely on their own savings (profits) to finance their 
operation.98   
 
   On the face of it, there is still a range of financing channels available to these companies.99  
They can get money from a variety of banking institutions and quasi-financial institutions, 
such as postal savings bank, large commercial banks, credit cooperatives, micro-credit 
companies, venture capital, etc.100 Companies can also seek a listing on the stock exchanges, 
when the Growth Enterprise Board (ChiNext) and Small and Medium Enterprise Board 
provide a lower listing requirement than the main boards.101  Finally, there is also ‘informal 
finance’, which is defined as ‘unconventional lending between enterprises, or between 
enterprises and individuals’. 102 According to the IMF, the scale of total social financing (less 
bank loans, equity-like items, and bond issuance) was around RMB 20 trillion in 2014, 
around 35 per cent of the year’s GDP.103  
 
    Awrey observes that there has been an increasingly important segment of the Chinese 
shadow banking system: USD 2 trillion dollar market for wealth management products 
(WMPs).104 WMPs are a form of collective investment vehicle that raises large pools of 
capital from multiple investors in exchange for the issuance of financial claims. 
 
WMPs possess a number of distinctive legal and economic features. First, despite 
being marketed by the financial institutions as substitutes for conventional deposit 
accounts, the liabilities generated by the majority of these products do not reside on 
bank balance sheets. Second, while WMPs typically lock-in investors’ capital  for  
relatively  short  periods  of  time,  this  capital  is  often invested  into  less  liquid,  
longer-term  assets. The resulting maturity  and liquidity  mismatches  thus  recreate  
the  fragile  capital  structure  of  banks. Third, WMPs have emerged largely in 
response to China’s interventionist approach toward both banking regulation and 
broader macroeconomic policy.105 
 
   This trend may echo the Zhongjin case, when the company has marketed itself as in the 
industry of capital management. The dramatic growth of WMPs can be attributed to several 
reasons.106 WMPs are not legally characterised as deposits and are, accordingly, exempt from 
certain PBOC’s requirements. Second, they provide a means the financial institutions of 
shifting unwanted assets off their balance sheets, by using capital raised in the WMPs to 
purchase its own unwanted loans or other assets. Third, the term structure of WMPs is often 
designed to ensure ostensible compliance with both the CBRC’s and the PBOC’s 
requirements, if it needs to be. According to Awrey, the emergence and growth of WMPs can 
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be regarded as a private  contractual  response  to  changes  in  the  constraints  imposed  by  
various  forms  of  public  regulatory  intervention.107 In other words, WMPs are designed to 
occupy the negative legal space created by the existence of public regulatory intervention 
elsewhere within the financial system. Unless Chinese regulators take action to close existing 
loopholes and address the risks posed by WMPs, further contractual innovations like WMPs 
will continue to exist.  
 
   Similarly, the case of Ezubao raises the concern of the legitimacy of P2P lending platforms. 
China’s P2P lending industry recorded transactions valued at USD 445 billion in 2017, 
comparable to around what China’s banks lent in one month.108 Meanwhile, of more than 
6,000 online lending platforms launched over the past several years, fewer than 2,000 were 
still remaining in 2018.109 Commentators attribute this to regulation, competition and fraud. 
Whilst the case of Ezubao may point to how fraud can thin the industry and consumers are 
getting sceptical about the integrity of platforms, there is also an important question of 
legality. As mentioned before, those involved in running Ezubao were convicted of 
fraudulent fundraising or illegally absorbing deposits. According to Chaffee and Rapp, P2P 
lending shares  all  of  the  risks  associated  with  traditional  ‘brick  and  mortar’  lending  
including  lending  fraud,  identity  theft,  money  laundering,  consumer  privacy  and  data-
protection  violations,  and  terrorism  financing.110 These risks are then married to and 
amplified by the anonymity and ubiquity of the Internet. Shen observed that China had no 
specific laws regulating P2P lending, apart from the provisions surrounding illegal 
fundraising as discussed above spanning across different laws and regulatory instruments.111 
He further indicated that P2P lending platforms had long been removed from the regulatory 
space of the CSRC, CBRC and PBOC.112 The CSRC oversees entities that issue securities 
and futures, but since P2P lending does not involve the issuance of securities, it is not within 
the CSRC regulatory mandate. The CBRC, on the other hand, oversees banking institutions 
when P2P lending is strictly not one of them. Furthermore, P2P lending also bypasses the 
PBOC’s regulations on financial markets because P2P platforms do not rely on the central 
bank’s lending of last resort. Nevertheless, with China’s rapidly developing markets and legal 
system, Shen’s observation is inevitably outdated. The Interim Administrative Measures for 
the Business Activities of P2P Lending Information Intermediaries was enacted on 17 August 
2016 by the CBRC, conjoint with other authorities.113 The Interim Measures consist of eight 
chapters with a total of 47 articles. In the view of You, the new regulatory regime represents 
a pivotal change leading to a regulatory paradigm shift from light regulation to tight 
regulation.114 The Interim Measures refine entry conditions for players in the P2P lending 
market. More importantly, the Interim Measures adopt several regulatory approaches to 
mitigate potential risks, including a multifurcate regulatory structure, negative list 
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management, information disclosure requirements and third-party-based monitoring. The 
compliance requirements may prove to be difficult for many of the existing P2P lending 
platforms, but will provide clarity for those strong enough to stay. 
 
   Other the demand side factors, the supply side factors can also play their role. As said, a 
financial system is an institution to allocate resources and thereby enable economic growth. 
Chinese households tend to have a higher saving rate than those in the Western world.115 A 
key to channel these savings to the entrepreneurs, who are capital hungry, is to ensure there 
are sufficient investment options, which are indeed fairly limited currently. 116  After the 
interest rate liberalisation in China, interest rates for deposits and loans are essentially the 
market rates, but no longer set by the PBOC.117 After the recent financial crisis when interests 
rates have been hitting an all-time low, this means that savers would get a measly return by 
putting their in a typical saving account. Stock market is an option but the press describes the 
behaviour of Chinese investors as ‘betting’ or putting stock in ‘Lady Luck’.118 Investing 
legend Warren Buffett has famously referred to the Chinese stock markets as ‘casino’.119 This 
prompts people to go to the real estate market, driving up the property price in major Chinese 
cities to record high. For example, homes in Shenzhen were sold at an average of RMB 
49,259 per square meter (or USD 690 a square foot), in April 2016, as much as the Rockridge 
neighborhood in Oakland in the US, a pricey part of the San Francisco Bay Area, where 
home prices averaged USD 704 a square foot.120   
 
   In light of these demand and supply side factors, the need to diversify and deepen China’s 
fundraising channels becomes apparent. The question will be how to formalise and properly 
regulate those channels.  
V. How Should Regulation Address the Problem? 
The market as an invisible hand guides participants in well-functioning market economies to 
allocate resources in ways that achieve economically efficient outcome. The starting point of 
regulation is that there is no need to regulate unless there is a failure of markets. 121 
Historically, the idea of investor protection stemmed from the risk of fraudulent or 
opportunities behaviour in the financial markets, making a case of a body of rules, commonly 
referred to as ‘securities law’ or ‘securities regulation’ to exist. 122  There are various 
considerations in determining an appropriate level of regulation.123 Firstly, what is the nature 
and extent of any market failures? Analysis of securities regulation often starts from the 
assumption that its ultimate goal is to attain efficient financial markets. An efficient market is 
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one in which prices always fully reflect the available information.124 The general idea is, the 
lower the cost of information distribution, the more efficient the market will be. Securities 
regulations are intended to reduce the cost of gathering, verifying and pricing information.125 
A second step is to determine the regulatory interventions required. Apart from disclosure 
duties, restrictions on fraud and manipulation can reduce information cost by placing the 
burden of verifying the information on the information source. 126  In the US, Federal 
intervention in the 1930s was justified by a contention of market failure.127 First, the market 
failed to protect investors from stock price manipulation and fraud. Second, it produced an 
inadequate level of corporate disclosure. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 were concerned with the disclosure requirement as well as the 
prevention of market manipulation and insider trading. A final step is an evaluation of such 
remedial intervention to see whether an alternative remedy needs to be sought.  
   Traditionally, Chinese attitude to financial regulation has been more like ‘crash-then-law’ 
or ‘growth-then-law’.128 For example, the Chinese stock markets had been established in the 
beginning of 1990s, but the first set of securities law in China did not come out until 1998. It 
is not to say this pattern is unique in China. Such a pattern of legal change is also witnessed 
in the US.129 It is also worth noting that China has a conservative stance in regulating the 
financial markets. In the early days of the Chinese stock market, the CSRC imposed a quota 
on the maximum number of shares that could be issued each year. Its intention was to curb 
the potentially excessive investment demand in a pre-mature market, where market 
participants had not developed an understanding of the market rules and their rights and 
obligations.130  Hence, it is not surprising to see China to conduct a similar approach in 
regulating alternative finance in line with their pragmatic process of economic reform, 
famously put by the legendary Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping as ‘crossing the river by feeling 
each stone’.131   
   As mentioned before, China has largely relied on existing laws, most notably, securities law 
and criminal law to regulate the emergence of alternative finance. Meanwhile, adjustments to 
regulation have been achieved by piecemeal rules and other rules issued by judiciaries and 
regulators.  In relation to existing laws, there has been a call for the decriminalisation of the 
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offence of illegal fundraising, in the absence of frauds.132 Although in other overseas markets, 
it is not uncommon to see criminal liabilities for financial or economic crimes, those crimes 
normally come with a fraudulent intent. In the US, Bernie Madoff conned his investors out of 
USD 65 billion. He was finally convicted of violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940, together with other charges of money laundering, perjury and theft, and received a 
sentence of 150 years in federal prison.133 In the UK, there is a distinction of fraudulent 
trading and wrongful trading.134 Only when a business is carried on with intent to defraud 
creditors or for any fraudulent purpose, the parties commit a criminal offence, and are subject 
to imprisonment up to ten years and/or a fine. Otherwise, if the parties are just negligent in 
carrying on trading when they should know there is no reasonable prospect to turn things 
around, there will only be a civil liability. Such a dual criminal and civil regime can be a 
model for China that Article 176 about illegally absorbing public deposits should be removed 
from the criminal law but Article 192 which concerns financial frauds can be retained. 
However, it is worth noting that there is a need to show negligence for wrongful trading in 
the UK but Article 176 is more like a strict liability, in a sense that a party is liable when 
certain thresholds are met in the course of fundraising. A more similar rule in the UK is 
perhaps the criminal sanction of making a public offer unless accompanied by an approved 
prospectus. 135 There is no way a non-public company can get such an approved prospectus. 
Indeed, it is not unique in China that a threshold is set to distinguish between a public offer 
and a private placement. In the past there was a threshold of 50 people in the UK, below 
which shares were not deemed to be offered to the public.136 However, now the Financial 
Services and Markets Act does not give a clear answer as to what constitutes an offer to the 
public.137 The trace of such an approach is still seen in Hong Kong, for example, a private 
company can only have a maximum of 50 shareholders.138 As discussed, such a requirement 
is also seen in China.  
   A parallel controversial point about illegal fundraising has been, whether 
economic/financial crimes should lead to a death penalty. 139  Despite the law on illegal 
fundraising was not formalised until 1995, the conviction and sentenced to death in 1994 of 
Shen Taifu, then president of Great Wall Electrical and Mechanical Technology Industry 
Company, had catalysed the legislative process and is widely regarded as the ‘first case of 
illegal fundraising’.140 Owing to the absence of relevant law at that time, Shen was convicted 
of corruption and bribery, instead of illegally raising RMB 1.37 billion per se. Since then, 
with the introduction of illegal fundraising as a crime, Shen was not the only one who faced a 
death sentence. In the Wu Ying case, Wu had initially been handed a death sentence which 
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was later suspended.141 In another high profile case decided roughly at the same time, Zeng 
Chengjie was not as fortunate.142 Zeng allegedly raised RMB 3.5 billion from more than 
20,000 people, and was convicted of illegal fundraising. The case of Zeng Chengjie sparked 
public outrage because Zeng was executed without his family being notified. This was widely 
criticised as ‘inhuman’ and ‘cold’, even in a country used to capital punishment.143 According 
to the Cornell Centre on the Death Penalty Worldwide, the number of executions in China 
(for all crimes, not just illegal fundraising) has been declining since 2007.144  However, 
according to Amnesty International’s new annual report on capital punishment, China still 
executed more people than the rest of the world combined in 2017.145 According to a survey 
of 455 criminal justice practitioners in China, as high as 91 per cent supported the death 
penalty in general.146 Meanwhile, the majority did not support the use of the death penalty for 
economic offences.147 
   There is certainly an inclination in China to shy away from death penalties. As a signatory 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, China has an obligation to uphold 
its Article 6, whereas ‘in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of 
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes’, which is largely reflected in Article 
48 of the Chinese Criminal Law. China is certainly moving towards this direction, especially 
in the context of this article, as evidence by its amendments to the Criminal Law in 2011 and 
2015.148  The Criminal Law originally stipulated that offenders of Articles 192 (illegally 
fundraising by fraudulent means), 194 (fraudulent activities with financial bills), and 195 
(fraudulent activities with letters of credit) who cause extraordinarily heavy losses to the 
interests of the state and the people shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or death, with 
forfeiture of property.149 The Eighth Amendment of the Criminal Law in 2011 retained the 
death penalty for Article 192 only.150 Then the Ninth Amendment in 2015 further reduced the 
number of crimes punishable by death from 55 to 46. 151  The nine crimes previously 
punishable by death include illegal fundraising by fraudulent means 152, together with other 
crimes like smuggling and prostitution. This is an evidence of the Chinese move towards a 
more liberal approach in regulating illegal fundraising, as well as its criminal law regime 
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overall. The Eighth and Ninth Amendments have abolished the death penalty for 13 
economic and non-violent crimes and 9 violent crimes respectively.153 Zhao and Xu observe 
that among the ten chapters in the Criminal Law, only ‘Chapter IX Crimes of Dereliction of 
Duty’ does not lead to any death penalty.154 There are still two crimes punishable by death 
under ‘Chapter III Crimes of Undermining the Order of Socialist Market Economy’ (the 
Chapter of Criminal Law containing economic crimes like illegal fundraising), but both are 
related to product safety.155 Pure financial crimes arguably will not lead to death sentence 
anymore. However, with 46 capital offences remaining, China still has the highest number of 
these offences in the world.156 In the view of Zhao, China should continue this direction of 
reducing capital offences.157 He is of the opinion that China should abolish the death penalty 
for crimes such as embezzlement and bribery.158 First, these crimes are non-violent in nature. 
Second and third, there is no evidence to suggest that the death penalty can deter crimes, and 
there are indeed alternatives such as life imprisonment.  
   Other than relying on existing laws, Chinese authorities have tried to use different types of 
regulatory instruments to implement piecemeal reforms or clarification of existing laws. One 
example, as discussed extensively before, is the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court 
of Several Issues on the Specific Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases about 
Illegal Fundraising. But fine-tuning a criminal regime is not adequate. Ideally, there should 
be a dual criminal and civil regime operating.159 A criminal regime gives public authorities 
the responsibility to investigate and pursue the offence. In addition to the functions fulfilled 
by public enforcement, i.e. justice and deterrence, civil remedies can compensate the 
wronged by allowing the private parties to sue and recoup losses in a court. Private actions 
are considered as a necessary supplement to public enforcement activities.160 In theory, the 
Chinese Criminal Law has compelled the perpetrators to return all the proceeds to the victims, 
with the help of the public authorities. Under Article 64 of the law, ‘All articles of property 
illegally obtained by the criminal conduct shall be recovered or he shall be ordered to make 
restitution or pay compensation for them. The legitimate property of the victims shall be 
promptly returned.’ Furthermore, it is also stipulated in the Securities Law that, where a 
company unlawfully makes a public offer or does so in any disguised form without approval 
from the relevant authorities, it will be ordered to cease the issuance and return the funds 
raised plus interests to the investors.161 To facilitate private actions, the Provisions of the 
Supreme Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Private 
Lending Cases were issued. 162  The Provisions are important in several ways. 163  First, 
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previously under the General Provisions on Lending, 164 validity of private lending contracts 
signed between legal entities has been   questionable. Article 11 of the Provisions confirms 
the validity and hence enforceability of a  private  lending  contract  entered between  legal  
entities  for  the  purposes  of  production  and  business  operation. In other words, the 
private loan contract will still be invalid if the loan is of a fraudulent or criminal nature 
(either on the lender’s or borrower’s side or both); or when  the  loan  is  obtained  from  
other  companies  or  by  fundraising  from  the employees, and then knowingly re-lent to the 
borrower for profit purposes.165 The latter transaction is clearly the business of a bank or 
other types of recognised financial institutions and remains forbidden unless conducted by 
these approved entities. Under the Criminal Law, whoever sets up a commercial bank or any 
other financial institution without the PBOC’s permission is a criminal offence.166 But in the 
context of this article, where illegal fundraising is concerned, it may not be really meaningful 
for the victims to sue. First, as shown earlier, in many cases the proceeds should probably 
have been spent by the perpetrators to support their lavish lifestyle. Second, the criminal law 
provides that the perpetrators’ own property used for committing the crime will be 
confiscated.167  These confiscated property, together with fines of the crime will then be 
handed over to the national treasury. There should not be many other assets left for the 
victims should a private action succeed. 
   As discussed, the setting up of a financial institution is strictly regulated by laws such as the 
Law on Commercial Banks and the Criminal Law. But China is clearly adopting a more 
liberal view towards accommodating new financial channels. The introduction of a formal 
regulatory framework for P2P lending as discussed above is one prominent example. Another 
example is small loan companies. In 2008, the Guiding Opinions of China Banking 
Regulatory Commission and the People's Bank of China on the Pilot Operation of Small-sum 
Loan Companies were issued to trial this new type of financial institution.168 Both the CBRC 
and the PBOC recognised the importance of effective allocation financial resources and 
guiding the flow of capital to rural areas and underdeveloped areas to foster development.169 
A small loan company is established with investments from natural persons, enterprises or 
other social organisations, which does not absorb the public deposits and operates small loan 
business.170  Small loan companies are not classified as banks because they cannot take 
deposits. Instead they fund themselves through equity, bonds and interbank borrowing. 
According to the PBOC, as of the end of 2015, there were 8,910 small loan companies in 
China.171 Although China has encouraged the rise of small loan providers, their presence 
remains small. For example, in the first nine months of 2014, they contributed only a tiny 
portion (around 1 per cent) of overall lending in China, with loans outstanding totalling RMB 
908 billion, compared with RMB 95 trillion in commercial bank loans.172 
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   It can be seen that China has tried their best to deepen their financial markets and improve 
the regulation, but investors cannot just count on the government to protect them. As the US 
Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, once said that ‘there is no such thing as an innocent 
purchaser of stocks’.173 When a person invests in any of those organisations or ventures of 
doubtful validity and of doubtful practices, he or she is not innocent. There is an entry 
strategy in corporate and financial law, in a sense that investors require some form of 
systematic disclosure to obtain an adequate supply of information.174 In an initial public 
offering on a stock exchange, a prospectus will serve this purpose.175 In accordance with the 
information within the prospectus, investors can then make an informed decision on whether 
or not they would like to invest. Senior executives of the issuer will face civil liabilities for 
false or misleading disclosures.176 Even in the case of a private company and placement, this 
is also true. The shareholders of a company have the right to inspect the financial reports and 
other documents of the company.177 There is nothing to stop a prospective investor from 
requesting the same, even if he or she is not yet a shareholder. Indeed, China is regarded as a 
top performer in shareholder protection, performing even better than the UK and the US.178 
This should give a good degree of confidence to equity investors. On the other hand, creditor 
protection can be understood in two aspects: contractual and proprietary. 179  The former 
prescribes rights against the debtor include covenants and other contractual terms that can 
restrict the debtor’s activities to protect the creditor’s interests. However, considering the 
victims of most illegal fundraising cases are unsophisticated investors, this may mean little to 
them as they are the deal-taker but not the deal-maker. As a deal-maker, a creditor may 
negotiate for a proprietary right over any asset of a borrower. Again, unsophisticated 
investors may not be in a position to request security. Other safeguards are not useful either, 
such as a minimum capital requirement of business. Zhongjin, as discussed above, had a 
registered capital of RMB 10 million, which was double the amount required by the law at 
that time, and way higher than the requirement in, such as the EU, but just around one-fifth of 
the requirement for the smallest commercial banks in China.180 Perhaps common sense is a 
better safeguard to them, as the old saying goes, ‘If it sounds too good to be true, it probably 
is.’ 
VI. Conclusion 
The earliest attempt to regulate illegal fundraising in China was seen in the Law on 
Commercial Banks in 1995. Later the approach was reinforced by the amendments to the 
Criminal Law in 1997. But the provisions are pretty basic, which contain no more than a 
sentence to describe the offence. For example, the key line of Article 176 is only, ‘Whoever 
takes deposits from people illegally or in disguised form and disrupts financial order shall be 
sentenced.’ A more severe crime as regulated by Article 192 involving a fraud element is no 
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more complicated, which says, ‘Whoever illegally raises funds by fraudulent means [should 
be] sentenced.’ For more than a decade and a half, from 1995 till an attempt from the 
Supreme People’s Court in 2010 to clarify the law, the courts had to make a conviction based 
on the very brief wordings of the law. The Interpretation is an important and timely move to 
set out clearly various thresholds which ought to be met to establish a breach. Yet, the state 
tends to enforce these rules in a pattern that they will use a minor rule (Article 176) for those 
who have powers and for regular citizens they will not hesitate to go for the most severe rule 
(Article 192) and sentence. The death sentences made in the high profile cases of Wu Ying 
and Zeng Chengjie have prompted the state to abolish the death penalty of Article 192 owing 
to a public outcry. This is consistent to the Chinese move to eliminate capital punishment for 
non-violent crimes, as a result of its commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
   There has been a call for the decriminalisation of illegal fundraising in the absence of 
frauds, i.e. Article 176. However, as this article has argued, even in a more developed market 
like the UK, a criminal sanction can be imposed when, for example, a public offer is made 
without an approved prospectus. The regime in China is not particularly harsh. Also, public 
enforcement is indeed a more desirable response to both market failures and incomplete law, 
especially in the case of China.181 Chinese police, formally known as the Ministry of Public 
Security, does take a proactive stance in enforcing the law on illegal fundraising by for 
example, establishing an online platform to collect information from a mass of victims to 
facilitate investigation and conviction. 182  Decriminalisation of the offence will keep the 
police out from the regime. A dual criminal-civil regime should work far better than civil 
remedies alone. Finally, while China has put a lot of efforts in an attempt to perfect its 
financial markets, for example, by having one of the best shareholder protection regimes in 
the world now, the genuine protection will always come from common sense. Investors must 
exercise adequate caution when putting money in lucrative yet dubious investment schemes. 
The introduction of formal regulation to fill the pre-existing regulatory void in certain new 
sectors of finance such as P2P lending should also help to reduce the number of dubious 
players in the market, so as to reach the overarching goal of the Chinese state in maintaining 
‘the steady growth of capital markets’. 
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